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Health Policy

The global health law trilogy: towards a safer, healthier,
and fairer world
Lawrence O Gostin, Mary Clare DeBartolo, Rebecca Katz

Global health advocates often turn to medicine and science for solutions to enduring health risks, but law is also a
powerful tool. No state acting alone can ward off health threats that span borders, requiring international solutions.
A trilogy of global health law—the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, International Health Regulations
(2005), and Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework—strives for a safer, healthier, and fairer world. Yet, these
international agreements are not well understood, and contain gaps in scope and enforceability. Moreover, major
health concerns remain largely unregulated at the international level, such as non-communicable diseases, mental
health, and injuries. Here, we offer reforms for this global health law trilogy.

Introduction
The Lancet-O’Neill Institute, Georgetown University
Commission on Global Health and the Law aims to
demonstrate the power of law to achieve global health
with justice. Here, as a prelude to the Commission’s full
report, we examine and offer reforms for this global
health law trilogy. New governance strategies would
assure the instruments’ success, providing an essential
roadmap for the new WHO Director-General.1
The WHO Constitution grants the organisation
extensive normative authority (panel 1).2 Although WHO
principally exercises normative authority through soft
law (codes of practice, action plans, and
recommendations), the organisation oversees three
major international legal instruments: The Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), International
Health Regulations (IHR), and the Pandemic Influenza
Preparedness (PIP) Frame
work. Each instrument is
grounded in a different constitutional function: Article 19
(Conventions), Article 21 (Regulations), and Article 23
(Recommendations). These agreements provide models
for global health diplomacy, advancing WHO’s historic
normative mission (figure).2 As international treaties, the
FCTC and IHR are legally binding. The PIP Framework
is not a formal treaty, but it does introduce an innovative
method of governance through enforceable contracts.

Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
Tobacco kills around 6 million people every year, with
80% of smokers living in low-income and middleincome countries.3 The FCTC—adopted in 2003 and
enforced in 2005—has 180 Parties (179 states and the
European Union).4 Highly populated countries such as
Indonesia and the USA, however, have not ratified. The
FCTC, comprising economic demand and supply
reduction strategies, acts as the legal rubric for tobacco
control, designed to “protect present and future
generations from the devastating social, environmental
and economic consequences of tobacco”.5
Social mobilisation has propelled FCTC implementation
and its continued normative work. The Framework
Convention Alliance (FCA), a network of civil society and
professional associations, advocates for and provides

technical assistance on tobacco regulation and litigation.
The coalition mobilises political will through powerful
and blunt messaging, such as its so-called death clock—
a running tally of tobacco-related deaths. The FCA
provides country needs assessments and reports on
implementation of the FCTC.
The Conference of the Parties (COP), the FCTC’s
governing body, issues legally persuasive guidelines
and decisions to interpret and implement the treaty.
The COP is also empowered to create legally binding
protocols. The Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in
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Panel 1: Typology of WHO legal instruments
Conventions, agreements
• Constitutional authority: Article 19 empowers the World Health Assembly to “adopt
conventions or agreements” by a two-thirds vote; Article 20 directs member states to
affirmatively “take action” by accepting or rejecting the convention or agreement
within 18 months
• Force of law: legally binding
• Scope: any matter within WHO’s competence
• Illustration: Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
Regulations
• Constitutional authority: Article 21 empowers the World Health Assembly to adopt
regulations; Article 22 specifies that regulations automatically enter into force for all
member states, except for those that proactively notify the WHO Director-General of
rejection or reservations within the specified timeframe
• Force of law: legally binding
• Scope: specific topics, such as preventing international spread of disease, causes and
nomenclatures of disease, public health practice, and pharmaceutical labelling and
standards
• Illustration: International Health Regulations (2005), International Classification of
Diseases and Related Health Problems (1990)
Recommendations
• Constitutional authority: Article 23 empowers the World Health Assembly to make
recommendations to member states
• Force of law: non-binding but persuasive
• Topic: any matter within WHO’s competence
• Illustrations: Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework, International Code of
Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes (1981), and Global Code of Practice on
International Recruitment of Health Personnel (2010)
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1890s
• 1892: adoption of the International
Sanitary Convention (predecessor to
the International Health Regulations)
• 1893: adoption of the International List
of Causes of Death (predecessor to the
International Classiﬁcation of Diseases)

1890

1900

1910

2000–05
• 2000: adoption by the UN of the Millennium Declaration
and Millennium Development Goals
• 2001: adoption by the UN of the Declaration of
Commitment on HIV/AIDS
• 2003: adoption by WHO of the Framework Convention
on Tobacco Control
• 2003: launch by WHO of the 3 by 5 Initiative (HIV
treatment for 3 million patients by 2005)
• 2004: adoption by WHO of the Global Strategy on Diet,
Physical Activity, and Health
• 2005: adoption by WHO of the Revised International
Health Regulations

1920

1930

1940

1950

2011–16
• 2011: launch by WHO of the Pandemic Inﬂuenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework
• 2011: adoption by the UN of the Political Declaration of the High-level Meeting
of the General Assembly on the Prevention and Control of Non-communicable Diseases
• 2012: adoption by the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control COP of the Protocol
to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products
• 2013: adoption by WHO of the Comprehensive Mental Health Action Plan
• 2013: adoption by WHO of the Global Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of
Noncommunicable Diseases (2013–20)
• 2014: PHEIC Declaration by WHO Director-General for wild poliovirus
• 2014: PHEIC Declaration by WHO Director-General for Ebola virus disease outbreak
in west Africa
• 2015: adoption by the UN of the Sustainable Development Goals
• 2016: PHEIC Declaration by WHO Director-General for Zika virus and complications
• 2016: scheduled review of the PIP Framework

1960

1970

1980

20th century
• 1948: adoption by WHO of Nomenclature with Respect to Diseases and Causes of Death
• 1951: adoption by WHO of the International Sanitary Regulations (predecessor to the
International Health Regulations)
• 1955: launch by WHO of the global programme to eradicate malaria
• 1959: launch by WHO of the global programme to eradicate smallpox
• 1978: adoption by WHO of the Declaration of Alma-Ata (Health for All) by the International
Conference on Primary Health Care
• 1981: adoption by WHO of the International Code of Marketing of Breast-milk Substitutes
• 1988: launch by WHO of the global programme to eradicate polio

1990

2000

2010

2020

2006–10
• 2006: launch by WHO of the Global Action Plan
for Inﬂuenza Vaccines
• 2008: adoption by WHO of the Action Plan for the
Global Strategy for the Prevention and Control of
Noncommunicable Diseases (2008–13)
• 2009: PHEIC Declaration by WHO Director-General
for pandemic inﬂuenza (H1N1)
• 2010: adoption by WHO of the Global Code of Practice
on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel
• 2010: adoption by WHO of the Global Strategy to
Reduce the Harmful Use of Alcohol

Figure: Key normative global health events
PHEIC=public health emergencies of international concern.

Tobacco Products, the only existing Protocol, aims to
reduce unlawful import and sale of tobacco products.
However, 15 additional Parties must ratify before the
Protocol can be enforced.6

Systemic deficiencies
Compliance and enforcement
State sovereignty presents a challenge to treaty compliance,
as does aggressive lobbying by the tobacco industry against
FCTC standards. The FCTC requires Parties to periodically
report on implementation, but governments are not always
forthright. Civil society shadow reports highlight
deficiencies, but the COP cannot force governments to
fulfil their obligations. FCTC dispute settlement, moreover,
is voluntary and only possible between Parties. The COP
cannot make a formal complaint if a state violates the
Convention. COP7 (Delhi, India; November, 2016) called
for knowledge hubs, toolkits, and strategic frameworks on
sustainable measures to strengthen implementation.7–9
The FCTC could be bolstered by built-in compliance
mechanisms. The World Trade Organization (WTO), for
example, has a robust dispute settlement adjudication
process, and arms control treaties often require verification
of compliance.

Novel technologies
As tobacco companies diversify into novel nicotine delivery
devices, regulatory responses have lagged. Although
2

companies claim, for example, that electronic cigarettes
reduce harm, they aggressively market to adolescents using
familiar strategies (cartoons, video games, and candy
flavouring).10 The FCTC targets traditional tobacco
products, but it has struggled to regulate novel technologies.
This contributes to governments’ continued divergent
approaches to electronic cigarettes, ranging from outright
bans and regulation (as prescribed smoking cessation
products) to no regulation.
The FCTC should harness new technologies to monitor
treaty implementation, particularly for the illicit trade
Protocol. Tracking import and sale of unlawful tobacco
products is complex and expensive, and beyond the
capacity of governments in low-income countries.
Tobacco companies capitalise on poor tobacco surveillance
by offering partnership programmes. The COP has urged
Parties to support Protocol implementation, but it cannot
require them to provide financial or technical assistance.11

International tobacco litigation
The tobacco industry has aggressively litigated against
tobacco control laws, bringing cases before domestic
courts, the WTO, and under international investment
treaties. International litigation has targeted states with
innovative laws such as plain packaging, graphic images,
and single presentation limits (only one tobacco product
per brand name). Low-income states are wary to assume
the economic and political costs incurred in defending

www.thelancet.com Published online May 15, 2017 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(17)31261-8

Health Policy

lawsuits. Panel 2 describes legal challenges to tobacco
control laws in Australia, Norway, and Uruguay, while
table 1 summarises national and international litigation.

Essential reforms
Using a bottom-up strategy to spur compliance is essential
for treaty implementation. Civil society organisations
should be funded and empowered to submit shadow
reports while pressuring governments to adopt FCTC
norms. The COP should issue strong guidelines for FCTC
implementation while publicly confronting industry front
groups and evaluating governments’ treaty performance.
The COP, for example, could create a standing technical
committee to propose regulations for novel technologies,
complementing the WHO Study Group on Tobacco
Product Regulation.16 Sustainable funding is also essential.
The COP transformed the FCTC’s voluntary assessed
contributions into mandatory contributions at the most
recent meeting in November, 2016, and continues to
encourage states and philanthropic organisations to
increase extra-budgetary funding and pursue revenuegenerating strategies.17,18
WHO should assertively defend States Parties in
trade and investment disputes. WHO and the FCTC
Secretariat, for example, filed authoritative amicus briefs
in Philip Morris versus Uruguay. WHO should be more
proactive in influencing WTO policy and decision
making, prioritising public health over trade. The COP
asked the FCTC Secretariat to be proactive in applying
for WTO observer status.19 Legal regimes must defer to
FCTC public health norms, setting a precedent for future
multisector public health action in settings such as
nutrition, alcoholic beverages, and mental health.

International Health Regulations (2005)
The origins of the IHR can be traced to European sanitary
conferences held from 1851 to 1926. WHO adopted the
International Sanitary Regulations in 1948, using its
extraordinary powers to make the regulations binding on
all member states unless they affirmatively opt out
(Articles 21, 22; panel 1). The World Health Assembly
amended the sanitary regulations several times, renaming
the treaty the IHR in 1969. In the aftermath of severe
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and recognising the
need to govern emerging infectious diseases, WHO
adopted fundamentally revised regulations in 2005.
The 2005 revision ushered in transformational reforms,
including an all-hazards strategy, early state reporting,
use of unofficial (non-state) data sources, and building
health-system capacities to prevent, detect, and respond to
potential public health emergencies of international
concern (PHEIC). The IHR empower WHO to coordinate
stakeholders and make recommendations while balancing
health with trade and human rights. The 2005 reform
proved prescient, with the Director-General subsequently
declaring four PHEICs: influenza (H1N1) in 2009, polio in
2014, Ebola virus in 2014, and Zika virus (together with

Panel 2: International tobacco control litigation
Norway: display ban
In 2009, Norway prohibited the display of tobacco products in any stores other than
tobacconists (termed the display ban). The display ban prohibited display of any tobacco
products or vending machine tokens; stores could present only a list of products and
prices in neutral typography and layout. Advertising (eg, with brands, logos, and images)
was prohibited. Similar bans were enacted in Iceland, Ireland, Finland, Panama,
New Zealand, and the UK. Philip Morris challenged Norway’s display ban, claiming it
unlawfully restricted free trade under the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement.
The Court of Justice for the European Free Trade Association States issued an advisory
opinion finding that the display ban was a quantitative import restriction, but left it to the
national court to decide whether the public health objective could be achieved by less
restrictive measures. In September, 2012, the District Court of Oslo upheld the display ban,
concluding that it was a suitable and necessary measure to ensure public health protection. It
said the absence of visible tobacco products in shops is essential to denormalise tobacco. The
Court ordered Philip Morris to pay 1·36 million Norwegian kroner to cover litigation costs.
Uruguay: single presentation
In 2008–09, Uruguay implemented a single presentation requirement precluding tobacco
manufacturers from marketing more than one variant of cigarette per brand family.
Based on this requirement, Philip Morris could not market Marlboro Red, Marlboro Gold,
Marlboro Blue, and Marlboro Green, but could market only one label. Uruguay also
required graphic warning labels covering 80% of the front and back of cigarette packages,
leaving only 20% for trademarks and logos. In 2010, Philip Morris requested arbitration at
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), asserting that
Uruguay had violated the bilateral investment treaty between Switzerland and Uruguay.
In July, 2016, the international trade arbitration panel upheld Uruguay’s tobacco control
measures as a valid exercise of the state’s police powers, stressing that Uruguay had
fulfilled the obligations of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC).12 The
panel noted that the FCTC is an evidence-based treaty guaranteeing the right to health.
The arbitration panel also ruled that the regulations were not a direct or indirect
expropriation of Philip Morris’s intellectual property. The panel ordered Philip Morris to
compensate Uruguay US$7 million for litigation expenses.
Australia: plain packaging
Australia was the first country to adopt plain packaging in 2011, whereby tobacco must
be sold in a uniform, drab, olive-brown package with graphic images. The legislation was
designed to avoid misleading consumers about the devastating effects of smoking.13
Since then, Canada, Chile, France, South Africa, and the UK have introduced similar laws.
Seeking to deter adoption of plain packaging in other countries, tobacco manufacturers and
countries friendly to the industry brought domestic and international litigation against
Australia, including an investor-state dispute arbitration conducted under the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and dispute settlement
proceedings in the World Trade Organization (WTO). In December, 2015, UNCITRAL ruled in
favour of Australia on a procedural claim, saying the industry had “abused” the arbitration
process.14 Reports indicate that the interim report of the WTO panel has found Australia’s
plain packaging measures to be a legitimate public health measure. The Dominican
Republic, Cuba, Indonesia, and Honduras are challenging Australia’s plain packaging as a
violation of trade and intellectual property. As the various cases proceed, Australia’s
litigation costs keep rising, and are estimated to exceed AUS$50 million.15

associated neurological conditions) in 2016. The DirectorGeneral also assembled IHR Emergency Committees for
Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) and yellow
fever without declaring a PHEIC, although WHO
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United Kingdom

European Union

India

Uruguay

Australia

Outcome

Victory

Victory

Victory

Victory

Victory*

Date

May, 2016

May, 2016

May, 2016

July, 2016

2017

Venue

UK High Court

European Court of Justice

Supreme Court of India

ICSID International Trade
Arbitration

WTO

Challenged
control
measure

Plain packaging

Graphic warning labels; banning
tobacco flavours; regulations for
electronic cigarettes

Warning label size

Warning label size and single
brand presentation

Plain packaging

Key points

The FCTC has a high status in EU
law; guidelines to the FCTC have
particularly high evidential value; the
FCTC and the WTO’s TRIPS
Agreement can be read together
without any risk of them colliding or
being inconsistent; both prevalence
and consumption data supported
the effectiveness of plain packaging
measures; there is nothing in the
ordinary principles of international
law that would require a court to
hold that TRIPS takes precedence
over the FCTC

The EU directive seeks to meet the
obligations of the European Union under
the FCTC; EU member states might
maintain or introduce additional
requirements regarding packaging of
tobacco products that go beyond the
requirements of the EU directive; it is
lawful for EU legislature, taking account
of FCTC guidelines, to impose a
prohibition on all characterising flavours;
the EU acted in accordance with COP
decision that urged Parties to consider
banning or restricting advertising,
promotion, and sponsorship of electronic
cigarettes

India’s warning labels are
among the world’s most
stringent, covering 85% of
the front and back of
cigarette packs; India’s
Government will proceed
with implementation of
the regulations and
opposes any further delay
in their implementation

Nowhere does the TRIPS
Agreement provide for a right to
use a trademark; in the Tribunal’s
view, adoption of the challenged
measures by Uruguay was a valid
exercise of its police powers to
protect public health; the
challenged measures were
adopted in fulfilment of
Uruguay’s national and
international legal obligations for
protection of public health

Ukraine withdrew from the
dispute settlement proceedings;
the Dominican Republic, Cuba,
Indonesia, and Honduras
challenged Australia’s plain
packaging measures; the dispute
settlement panel advised the
parties that it now expects to
issue its final report in July, 2017;
the interim report validated
Australia’s plain packaging as a
legitimate public health measure

ICSID=International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. WTO=World Trade Organization. FCTC=Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. TRIPS=Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.
COP=Conference of the Parties. *As per interim report.

Table 1: National and international tobacco litigation

continues to monitor both closely. Currently, the
organisation is on high alert because of circulating avian
influenza viruses. Yet, the gap between the instrument’s
norms and its real-world impact is cavernous, as the Ebola
virus disease epidemic revealed.20

restrictions. Governments and private actors often
disregard WHO guidance.22 In turn, states wary of
economic repercussions might hesitate to report
unusual findings. Dispute resolution is available only if
Parties consent.

Systemic deficiencies

Flexibility and politics

The effectiveness of the IHR has suffered from states’
non-compliance and WHO’s inability to coordinate
stakeholders and respond decisively. The major test of an
instrument’s effectiveness is stakeholder compliance,
but WHO has few enforcement tools, failing to hold
states accountable for weak IHR core capacities or
counterproductive travel and trade restrictions.

Declaration of a PHEIC can be subject to political
influence because of a country’s concerns about reduced
tourism and trade. The Director-General has been
inconsistent in deciding whether, and when, to declare a
PHEIC. After criticism for overreacting to H1N1, the
Director-General delayed for months before declaring
Ebola a PHEIC. The Director-General promptly declared
a PHEIC for Zika virus and associated neurological
deficits, but ended the PHEIC declaration even as the
trajectory of the outbreak remained uncertain. The
Director-General further declared an emergency for
sporadic wild-type poliovirus cases, but has thus far
refrained from declaring a PHEIC for MERS and yellow
fever. The reasoning and evidence for convening
emergency committees, declaring a PHEIC, and ending
the emergency have often been opaque.
A more flexible governance structure could enable
WHO to mount earlier, event-specific responses. Global
commissions in the wake of the Ebola virus disease
epidemic proposed an intermediate-level emergency
declaration or a standing emergency committee, or a
combination of both, to continuously monitor circulating
pathogens of concern.20 Enhancing transparency and
accountability would improve international confidence.23

Capacity building
National capacities to detect, report, and respond are the
foundation for preparedness. Yet, WHO has routinely
allowed states to delay fulfilling their responsibilities.
Only 30% of States Parties report meeting core
capacities.21 The non-compliance rate is probably higher
because states evaluate themselves. Governments have
few geopolitical incentives to build core capacities, and
many have not devoted the necessary resources.

WHO recommendations
The IHR empower the Director-General to make
recommendations on the basis of the advice of the
emergency committee. Yet, when outbreaks arise,
public fears can fuel over-reactions, such as scientifically
unwarranted quarantines and travel or trade
4
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One Health
The IHR encompass zoonotic diseases but do not
address the integral connections between the health of
people, animals, and the environment. WHO, together
with the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE),
has built an operational framework, but the One Health
concept is not embodied in the text of the IHR.24 WHO
should consider expanding the text of the regulations
and partner with complementary organisations.

Sharing benefits and burdens
Global health security requires cooperative sharing of
biological samples to facilitate research while ensuring
fair distribution of benefits. Yet, there is no global
agreement on data sharing and reciprocal benefits outside
pandemic influenza. Linking the IHR and PIP Framework
(as discussed below) would enhance international
preparedness. Failure to deal with inequities in access to
essential vaccines and pharmaceuticals will undermine
global cooperation, thus undermining security for all.

Sustainable financing
The IHR encourage states to provide technical and
financial assistance, but sustainable financing has
lagged. WHO’s emergency operations are also underfinanced. The organisation has raised barely half the
budget for its core emergency capacity and response
plan, and only a third for the US$100 million Contingency
Fund for Emergencies.25,26 The Global Health Security
Agenda (GHSA) provided $1 billion towards building
and evaluating core capacities, but it operates outside
WHO. Moreover, the USA might not reauthorise GHSA
funding.

Essential reforms
The focal problems of the IHR are caused primarily
by poor implementation and enforcement rather than
by textual deficiencies.27 Crucial reforms include
rigorous matrices, independent evaluations, trans
parency, accountability, and funding.
In 2016, WHO announced a new framework to monitor
IHR core capacities: a Joint External Evaluation (JEE)
tool.28 The JEE, which integrates GHSA matrices, relies
on independent experts working alongside national
health officials, with outcomes made fully transparent.29
Governments are then expected to develop countryspecific action plans. JEE is voluntary, but over 65 states
have either completed or are planning to complete
evaluations.25 There is a 5-year interval between the
evaluations, which is too long given the need for up-todate capacities. WHO also encourages states to do incountry simulations.
Rigorous JEEs require trained evaluators working over
a multi-year period. Yet, WHO has been unable to finance
these operations. Furthermore, the GHSA is due to end
in 2019, with no assurance of congressional
reauthorisation. Finland leads the Alliance for Country

Assessments for Global Health Security and IHR
Implementation, a public–private partnership formed to
provide both financial and technical assistance. Yet,
available resources are unlikely to fill the substantial
funding gaps.
International donors also have not supported health
systems, while member states have resisted the
increased assessed contributions. The World Bank’s
Pandemic Emergency Facility (PEF) could condition
grants on the basis of completion of the JEE process,
but the PEF itself is narrowly focused and underfunded.30 The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
should consider including national preparedness in its
macroeconomic assessments; countries pay close
attention to IMF assessments because it expands their
access to capital.31
Finally, the IHR are not well understood outside
health ministries, and governments have not integrated
IHR capacities into universal health coverage.
Consequently, the IHR and Sustainable Development
Goals operate in silos. The IHR might never reach their
full potential unless political leaders prioritise funding
and empower WHO.

Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework
The PIP Framework might be the most novel WHO legal
instrument, recognising the global value of equal footing
between sharing of influenza viruses and access to
benefits. The Framework, adopted in 2011, creatively
covers industry and civil society, as well as States Parties.
It uses contract law to enforce its norms. Although not a
treaty, the Framework has features of international law:
shared responsibilities, stakeholder cooperation, and
compliance mechanisms.
The withholding of H5N1 influenza samples from the
WHO’s Global Influenza Surveillance and Response
System (GISRS; then called the Global Influenza
Surveillance Network) in 2007 provided the impetus for
the PIP Framework.32 Countries asserted sovereignty
over the virus, arguing that the global virus-sharing
regime was inherently unjust; governments were
expected to share biological materials but could not
afford the medical products developed from those
samples.
The PIP Framework has two key elements: nonbinding norms and legally binding contracts. Contracts,
known as standard material transfer agreements
(SMTAs), broaden the range of actors that are
traditionally the subject of international law. SMTAs
bind pharmaceutical companies, diagnostic companies,
and academic institutions that are economic
beneficiaries of virus sharing. The PIP Framework
shows how international rule-making can evolve to
guide the conduct of non-state actors.
From a social justice perspective, the Framework
balances obligation–benefit relationships among parties,
designed to spur research while promoting equitable
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SMTA benefit commitments

Approximate 2015
partnership contribution
range (US$)

SMTA2 examples

Group A: vaccine and antiviral
manufacturers

Donate at least 10% of real-time pandemic vaccine production to WHO; reserve at least
$2638 to $7 123 339
10% of real-time pandemic vaccine production at affordable prices to WHO; donate at least (based on average annual
[X] treatment courses of needed antiviral medicine for the pandemic to WHO; reserve at
influenza product sales)
least [X] treatment courses of needed antiviral medicine for the pandemic at affordable
prices; grant fair and reasonable licenses to manufacturers in developing countries,
including in respect of affordable royalties; grant royalty-free licenses to manufacturers in
developing countries or grant royalty-free, non-exclusive licenses to WHO that can be
sublicensed (WHO might sublicense these licenses in accordance with sound public health
principles)

China National Biotech Group;
Sanofi Pasteur; Glaxo Group
Limited; Serum Institute of India;
MedImmune

Group B: manufacturers of
products relevant to pandemic
influenza preparedness and
response (eg, diagnostic test
manufacturers)

Donate to WHO at least [X] diagnostic kits needed for pandemics; reserve for WHO at least $2638 to $448 507 (based
[X] diagnostic kits needed for pandemics, at affordable prices; support, in coordination
on average annual
with WHO, strengthening of influenza-specific laboratory and surveillance capacity in
influenza product sales)
developing countries; support, in coordination with WHO, transfer of technology,
know-how, and processes for pandemic influenza preparedness and response in
developing countries

Quidel Corporation

Group C: other recipients of
pandemic influenza biological
materials outside of GISRS
(eg, research or academic
institutions)

Donations of vaccines; donations of pre-pandemic vaccines; donations of antiviral drugs;
donations of medical devices; donations of diagnostic kits; affordable pricing; transfer of
technology and processes; granting of sublicenses to WHO; laboratory and surveillance
capacity building

Baylor College of Medicine; Shiga
University of Medical Science;
University of Bergen; National
Research Centre, Egypt; National
Veterinary Research Institute,
Nigeria

Contributions made by
influenza vaccine,
diagnostic, and
pharmaceutical
manufacturers through the
GISRS

SMTA=Standard Material Transfer Agreement. GISRS=Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System. [X]=number of doses or treatment courses.

Table 2: Benefit-sharing features of the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework

access to supplies and vaccines during pandemics.
Benefits include specific monetary and in-kind
commitments, such as donating vaccines to WHO
stockpiles, offering products at affordable prices, or
granting royalty-free licenses (table 2).
The PIP Framework has introduced another major
innovation: GISRS users must make partnership
contributions in addition to benefits negotiated in SMTAs.
These contributions support preparedness and response
while sustaining the GISRS. As of Jan 31, 2017,
contributions reached $117·8 million,33 with approximately
70% supporting laboratory and surveillance, 10% going
towards disease burden studies, and 20% to prepare for
pandemic preparedness.34 The PIP Framework underwent
a scheduled review, with its report presented to the
Executive Board in January, 2017.35

Systemic deficiencies
The PIP Framework delivers tangible benefits, with
accountability, but it has a narrow scope and limited
funding while failing to adapt to new technologies.

Narrow scope
The PIP Framework covers only influenza viruses with
human pandemic potential, not even seasonal influenza.
Monitoring of seasonal influenza viruses is essential for
rapid detection of influenza strains. The PIP Framework
review recommended that WHO study the impact of
including seasonal influenza in the Framework.
Researchers cannot readily identify genetic shifts or
novel viruses without continuous monitoring of
circulating seasonal viruses. More importantly, the PIP
6

Framework does not apply to non-influenza pathogens,
including circulating viruses (eg, MERS, Ebola virus,
Zika virus, and yellow fever). The review group
recommended that the PIP Framework serve as a
“foundational model of reciprocity for global public
health that could be applied to other pathogens”.35 An
international agreement on benefit sharing for major
circulating pathogens would improve emergency
preparedness.

Funding
The Global Action Plan for Influenza Vaccines (GAP),
launched in 2006 as a 10-year initiative with a broader
mandate encompassing seasonal and pandemic
influenza, concluded in 2016. GAP supported capacity
enhancement and technology transfer to develop
vaccine-manufacturing capabilities in lower-income
countries. With the end of GAP, there will be added
pressure on partnership contributions to sustain
capacity development.36 Moreover, the financing shortfall
in WHO’s Contingency Fund for Emergencies
underscores the need for sustainable financing that an
expanded PIP Framework, and accompanying
partnership contributions, could provide.26 The review
group
recommended
increasing
partnership
contributions to match the increased operating costs of
the GISRS system.37

Technological advances
Genetic sequence data pose a major security risk,
enabling scientists to recreate viruses and enhance their
functions. If the private sector had open access to genetic
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sequence data, it might have little incentive to offer
benefits.38 The PIP Framework’s application to genetic
sequence data, however, remains unclear.39 The review
group recommended amending the Framework’s
definition of PIP biological materials to include genetic
sequence data.36 This would require political buy-in by
member states and non-state actors. However, during the
January, 2017, Executive Board meeting, the USA
opposed inclusion of genetic sequence data in the
definition of PIP biological materials.
Additionally, if a universal influenza vaccine were
developed, the PIP Framework’s utility could be
undermined. Currently, a seasonal influenza booster is
required annually to confer immunity. If a universal
vaccine covered both seasonal and pandemic influenza
viruses, the need to share viruses through GISRS would
be diminished; one foot of the equal footing relationship
would no longer be present and there would be
diminished incentives for benefit sharing.

Legal barriers
The PIP Framework’s novel features can be burdensome.
The transaction time to complete contract negotiations is
considerable, especially with a leanly staffed secretariat.
To date, ten manufacturers and more than 50 academic
institutions have entered into SMTA2 contracts.40
However, some manufacturers are reluctant to negotiate
SMTAs or offer benefit-sharing commitments.36
Moreover, competing international agreements
compromise the PIP Framework. The Nagoya Protocol
on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their
Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity41
establishes access and benefit sharing for the transfer
of genetic resources. The Nagoya Protocol is interpreted
as giving States Parties sovereign rights over viruses
discovered in their territories, even if legal experts
suggest that governments cannot own a virus.42 The
mandates of the Nagoya Protocol and the PIP
Framework overlap, even conflict, on the duty to share
pathogens. Compared with the Nagoya Protocol, which
is a binding treaty, the PIP Framework’s non-binding
nature threatens its international legal standing.43
WHO is in consultations with the Convention on
Biological Diversity secretariat, but future rules
on sharing pathogenic biological materials remain
in flux.44

Luck
The world, fortunately, has been unable to assess the
Framework’s true power in the absence of pandemic
influenza. If a pandemic emerged, would states and
stake
holders abide by their commitments or would
electorates steer them toward self-protection? WHO
might not have the political influence to enforce
contractually agreed benefit contributions during
health crises.

Essential reforms
The World Health Assembly should incorporate genetic
sequence data into the PIP Framework, empowering
the secretariat to work with industry partners to develop
technology to monitor genetic sequence data sharing.
However, the movement towards open access to
research data poses a challenge, because widespread
dissemination of genetic sequence data can pose a
bioterrorism threat and diminish funding incentives
from private industry.
While acknowledging the epidemiological uniqueness
of the influenza viruses, incorporation of non-influenza
pathogens into the PIP Framework would enhance
health security. A United Nations High Level Panel
recommended that WHO renegotiate the Framework to
include other novel pathogens, while also making it
legally binding.45 Expansion of the Framework would
support new public–private partnerships, including the
Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI),
to outsmart epidemics. The World Health Assembly
should incorporate seasonal influenza into the
Framework and negotiate a new legal instrument for
other novel pathogens.
The Assembly should also increase partnership
contributions, especially with the end of the GAP. At
present, partnership contributions cover only 50% of the
2010 GISRS running costs. Furthermore, industry
leaders should be held accountable for entering into
SMTAs and accompanying partnership contributions. To
encourage compliance and avoid free-riding, the PIP
secretariat, minimally, should publicly identify
uncooperative contracting parties. Finally, the secretariat
should be empowered to enforce SMTAs by, for example,
blocking delivery of virus samples.

Lessons for development of WHO norms
The global health law trilogy, despite its weaknesses, offers
proof that global health law can be a powerful tool. The
new WHO Director-General should push for novel global
health laws on major health hazards (eg, noncommunicable diseases, mental health, and injuries) and
new initiatives (eg, universal health coverage). The lessons
learned from 21st century international health law are that
broad scope, robust compliance, inclusion of public and
private actors, and sustainable financing are essential to
success. Legal instruments must also be flexible, with the
capacity to evolve with time, technological advancement,
and scientific evidence. In an age of nationalistic populism,
collective action remains crucial to ameliorate globalised
health threats, helping to realise the right to health.
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